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Abstract
In this paper, we suggest an approach to analysing policies relating to the
COVID-19 pandemic. We discuss the formulation of policy and sketch how
the approach can be applied to different specific challenges as policymakers
try to make difficult choices for managing the pandemic and protecting the
economy and society.
I. Introduction
When the full reality of the COVID-19 pandemic became apparent in March
2020, a range of increasingly stringent measures were put in place to halt the
spread of the virus as the death toll mounted. Above all, the focus then was on
ensuring that the limited capacity in intensive care units would not be overly
stretched. The economic consequences of closing down significant parts of the
economy often seemed like a secondary consideration but, in a short period of
time, schemes were introduced to deal with the economic consequences of
limiting economic activity.
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The term ‘lockdown’ entered the lexicon as a catchall for a range of
measures – encouraging working from home, limiting public gatherings,
keeping people off public transport, and curbing casual social interactions.
Implementing lockdown included efforts to shield the vulnerable and to
encourage those with symptoms to self-isolate. For almost the whole
population, this was an unprecedented measure. But anyone who was aware
of the history of pandemics would recognise echoes of such policy measures.
During episodes of the Black Death, which ravaged the world for around
four centuries, there were frequent lockdowns and quarantine measures put
in place.1 But this could not stop around 50 million people falling victim to
the disease over this period. It suffices to say that human societies have had to
manage serious infectious diseases throughout history and to try to mitigate
the economic consequences.
The starting point for the most recent lockdown is different from what
happened in the past. First, we live in a modern globalised economy with
complex national and international supply chains where economic shocks are
transmitted across space. Second, modern states in developed countries play
a major role in managing their economies and in supporting their citizens.
This was largely a twentieth century phenomenon with increases in state
spending rising from around 10 to 40 per cent of GDP over the century in
many advanced countries. Third, modern states are more accountable and
more dependent, therefore, on the support of their citizens than in the past,
with most of the rich part of the world presided over by governments that are
deemed to be democratic in one way or another.
These differences create both challenges and opportunities. There are
challenges because the restrictions on behaviour range broadly between local
and global activities. Moreover, there is much more scope for comparing
experiences that can be beneficial for learning but may also lead governments
to follow what other governments are doing rather tailoring policies to local
conditions. However, there are also opportunities where such learning is
beneficial, and major crises have frequently been opportunities for renewal
and building new forms of state capacity with lasting benefits.2
Mainstream public economics has generally paid scant attention to public
health emergencies and their consequences. The textbook approach analyses
the economics of public good provision and transfer programmes in general
but rarely has this focused on taking emergency measures of the kind that we
have seen in recent months. There is also comparatively little discussion of
how far government policy can steer citizens’ behaviour through exhortation
1The word ‘quarantine’ reputedly has its origins in the Venetian Italian word quarantino, the period of
40 days for which ships and people were isolated during an outbreak of plague.
2Besley and Persson (2011) discuss the economic and political factors behind decisions to build state
capacity, discussing the centrality of war in this process.
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and coordination, which has proved to be important through the lockdown.
In particular, how governments can shape behavioural norms has received
little attention compared with the use of standard economic incentives
and regulations.
This short paper looks at some of the issues that come out of this
pandemic and how we might think about the economics of lockdown from
first principles. There is now a body of emerging economic research on the
impact of the pandemic. The role of this paper is not to survey this. Instead,
our primary focus is on exploring ways to achieve a reasonable combination
of economic and public health considerations or outcomes. Viewing this
as a trade-off between lives and livelihoods does have value in focusing
some aspects of policy thinking. However, it is also simplistic for reasons
that we outline. The policy and analytical questions now and in the future
concern how to manage emergence from the lockdown, combining insights
from economics with those from public health and medical sciences. This
requires understanding the heterogeneous impacts of policy alternatives on
different groups, sectors and regions. We discuss an analytical framework for
considering alternative options as well as discussing the transition from rescue
to recovery and the need to prepare for that recovery now.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section,
we look at the context in some detail alongside some of the measures that
have been implemented since lockdown. We then review policy objectives
in Section III, before suggesting a way of approaching the policy challenge
in Section IV. In Section V, we briefly discuss some applications, while in
Section VI we examine some next steps. Finally, Section VII contains some
concluding comments.
II. The context
The term ‘lockdown’ refers to a range of policy measures that were
implemented over a fairly short period of time during March 2020. Table 1
gives an overview of these measures at critical dates. Most of these
involved direct restrictions on economic and social activities; restricting
economic activities that fostered social interactions, such as mass sporting
and cultural events, as well as bars and restaurants. In addition, there was
a dramatic reduction in the use of public transportation and educational
establishments, including closure of schools. A variety of support measures
were also introduced for workers and businesses, the centre piece of which
was a furlough scheme for workers and government-guaranteed loans,
particularly for small businesses. Liquidity problems were also eased through
postponement of tax and rent payments.
The speed with which these measures were enacted was remarkable, as was
the scale of support; around 9 million workers were eventually being supported
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TABLE 1
Key measures during lockdown
Date Measure
4 March Expanded public information campaign is announced, focusing on
handwashing for 20 seconds.
11 March Budget 2020: £5bn COVID-19 response fund for pressures on the NHS and
other public services (later announced: £1.6bn to local authorities, £1.3bn
to enhance NHS discharge processes); WHO declares COVID-19
pandemic.
12 March PM announces new self-isolation measures for those with symptoms.
16 March Government announces new social distancing measures, including for anyone
in a household with symptoms of COVID-19 to stay home for 14 days.
Government advises that that mass gatherings should not take place, in line
with new social distancing measures.
17 March Chancellor announces £330bn to support economy during COVID-19
outbreak.
19 March The Coronavirus Bill 2020 is introduced as emergency legislation to support
the government to respond to COVID-19, including a wide range of powers
and flexibilities.
20 March Government announces further social distancing measures to close
entertainment, hospitality and indoor leisure premises; schools, colleges
and nurseries in England ordered to close ‘until further notice’; bars,
restaurants and shops to close, and new measures to support employers and
employees.
23 March Further social distancing measures come into effect requiring people to stay
at home, stopping social gatherings and ordering the closure of certain
businesses.
26 March New support announced for the self-employed.
16 April Lockdown kept in place for at least three more weeks; five conditions for
easing measures announced.
23 April Announcement of new infrastructure to roll out contact tracing on a large
scale, including an NHS contact tracing app and hiring 18,000 staff to work
as contact tracers.
10 May Announcement of first steps for ‘reopening society’ from the lockdown
measures, including encouraging people to go to work if they cannot work
from home.
Source: The Health Foundation: https://www.health.org.uk/news-and-comment/charts-and-infographics/
covid-19-policy-tracker.
by the furlough scheme in the UK. Most of this has been financed with
increases in borrowing alongside quantitative easing measures by the Bank
of England. The flipside of this was a sharp contraction in economic activity.
The decision to lock down large parts of the economy has major
implications for well-being. It is important to recall that the economy does
not exist as an end in itself, but because it allows people to work and make
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a living and to acquire goods and services. It is also a basis for the funding
of public services, which do not themselves directly generate revenues. When
the government decided to move towards the lockdown, there was immediate
recognition that there was a need for schemes to protect workers and provide
ways of easing liquidity problems in businesses. There has also been support
for hard-to-reach groups such as the self-employed, who generally pay less
tax due to having that status. This raises important questions about a system
of social insurance. The UK offers little in the way of reciprocal benefits,
something that is likely to be reconsidered in light of the crisis.
The justification for the lockdown was the risk that infectious people pose
to others, especially certain vulnerable groups, had we continued with the
physical interactions associated with a normally functioning economy and
society. Economies thrive on physical proximity and mobility of goods and
people. Lockdown hit at the very heart of this. Estimates now suggest that
there was an immediate hit to the economy, on a scale that will likely show
up in years to come as the biggest recession since record-keeping began.
But there is also evidence that this hit has been highly heterogeneous, with
poorer households taking large hits to their earnings while rich households
experience large (proportionate) reductions in their consumption along with
higher savings.3
When assessing the impact of lockdown measures, it is important to realise
that had the pandemic been allowed to continue without a lockdown, there
would have been considerable economic and social costs in terms of sickness,
death, and the self-protection that individuals would have adopted. There is
some hint of this in Hacioglu et al. (2020a, b), who find that consumption
was declining ahead of the formal lockdown measures being brought in as
people changed their behaviour and, further, that lifting of lockdown did not
have an instantaneous impact on behaviour. It is thus hard to know what
the counterfactual would have looked like. Hence, caution is needed when
comparing the status quo from a year ago to what is happening now, and it
would be misleading to attribute the difference exclusively to the lockdown.
It is increasingly realised how unevenly the economic and social costs and
benefits of lockdown are distributed. For example, there are big variations
between young and old, different types of workers, some ethnic groups, urban
and rural, geography, and rich and poor that aggregate numbers do not reflect.
Thus, a much more granular analysis of how lockdown has affected the
economy and society is required to understand its effects. Many workers can
work from home in a lockdown and have little perceptible direct economic
hit from the measures put in place, while others have lost their livelihoods
completely. The young, who are much less affected by the disease directly,
will likely pay a significant part of the economic price – possibly paying higher
3See, for example, Hacioglu, Kaenzig and Surico (2020a, b).
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taxes over their lifetimes to fund the measures, having poorer job opportunities
and lower pay, and losing out on education.4 These are effects and insights that
economists and other social scientists should work on and are well placed to
bring out. Our focus here is primarily on economic consequences rather than
social consequences more generally.
III. Objectives
1. Framing the choices
A lot of the debate about the impact of COVID-19 is in terms of two
aggregates: income protection and lives saved.5 We use this as a starting point
for our discussions. This is often conceived of as a trade-off as sketched
in Figure 1, which illustrates the possibility that different combinations of
policy can generate different outcomes for income protection and lives saved.
This kind of approach has been developed formally in the new literature,
which combines epidemiology with macro-economics.6 The reason that this
represents a trade-off is because we have drawn it as downward-sloping over
a range of outcomes, thereby suggesting that saving more lives can only be
done with policies that incur greater economic costs. But, on closer inspection,
Figure 1 does not actually illustrate a pure trade-off, as we have drawn a region
where the curve is upward (i.e. there is a range over which more lives are saved
and incomes are also higher).
While drawing a figure like this is easy and useful for framing, knowing
the possibilities and how they are affected by specific policy decisions is not
at all easy in practice. And there has been much research, since the onset of
the COVID-19 pandemic, devoted to understanding how policies work and
provide protection for citizens, either by reducing infection risks or protecting
incomes. Also, it is important to have a perspective over time: actions today
influence not only deaths and illness in the coming weeks but also in the
coming years.
It is also worth noting that presenting the idea of a trade-off between health
and the economy is a very different approach from how historical discussions
of health and the economy have progressed, as stressed in Deaton (2014).
Although the direction of causality is not straightforward, more successful
economies have generally had healthier citizens, and investing in the health of
citizens is acknowledged to have had significant economic benefits, thereby
creating an upward-sloping curve between income and health. We expect this
4The potential long-run effects of large-scale unemployment during the COVID-19 crisis in the United
States are discussed in von Wachter (2020).
5For discussions relevant to associated trade-offs, see, for example, Ferreira (2020) and Gans (2020).
6See, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2020), Alvarez, Argente and Lippi (2020), Eichenbaum, Rebelo and
Trabandt (2020), Gollier (2020) and Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2020).
© 2020 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
The economics of lockdown 499
FIGURE 1
A policy trade-off
to be true in the long run, especially if measures are put in place to reduce the
likely recurrence of severe pandemics.
If the choices available to policymakers resemble Figure 1, then one way
to think about policy choices is to decide where we would like to be on the
spectrum of income protection and saving lives. However, there are good
reasons for being cautious about conveying things in this way.
First, we are far from having anything like the knowledge that is needed
to draw a practically useful version of Figure 1. The models that have been
developed are useful in trying to quantify these trade-offs but they have to
use parametrisations of both economic and epidemiological relationships, and
there is huge uncertainty.7 Some of this can be quantified but there is also
unquantifiable uncertainty, which makes our thinking about confidence level,
in a formal statistical sense, very difficult. The future path of the economy
and the progression of the disease depend on future policies, which influence
behaviour today, and nobody – not even the government itself – knows what
that path will look like. So, translating a picture like Figure 1 to policy
decisions is not straightforward.
Second, it is hard to know how far economic responses are due to policy
and how far they are direct responses to the disease. Economic models begin
with standard features where incentives are shaped by economic returns to
different activities conceived of in monetary terms. However, such models are
quite narrow, with psychological factors, such as fear, that can play a potential
7See Manski (2020) for an insightful discussion of uncertainty in the context of COVID-19
policy strategies.
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role. More generally, there is a need to be cognisant of interdependence in
decision-making as people follows norms. It is also important that there is trust
in what people are told by government and in what fellow-citizens are doing.
None of these factors is easily quantified and factored into the policymaking.
Moreover, many of the policies that are being considered are not standard, and
hence there is not an established body of empirical knowledge to draw upon. A
case in point is responses to messaging by government as a means of changing
behaviour, as in campaigns to encourage social distancing. Toxvaerd (2020)
discusses a wider approach to behaviour in the context of social distancing
decisions and stresses the importance of messaging.
2. Social judgements
Defining a welfare function to apply to the trade-off depicted in Figure 1 also
raises issues. The standard welfare economics approach conceives of societal
trade-offs in terms of a social welfare function defined on utilities. And,
these ideas have been operationalised in a variety of ways for making social
decisions. One well-known approach, which has been influential in health
economics, particularly in examining alternative medical treatments, is the use
of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). Miles, Stedman and Heald (2020)
have used this approach to suggest that the economic costs of lockdowns have
far exceeded the benefits when using standard values of QALYs of £30,000 as
used by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE).8 NICE
has utilised a QALY-based approach to many medical decisions, such as the
use of certain drugs or procedures, and it has generally been seen to be useful
in reaching decisions in a structured and transparent way. But the trade-off in
such cases has a common metric for comparing treatments within an overall
spending envelope. Such approaches have not been so influential in discerning
what level of resources should be devoted to spending on health care as a
whole. This requires valuing life and health relative to other goods – a much
more challenging task.
Approaches to policymaking that are based on valuing life raise a number
of issues. We know, for example, that societies have always and will always
value lives differently in different circumstances. Air accidents receive a huge
amount of attention and safety measures are very tight, while deaths from
malnutrition or air pollution pass with far less attention and measures to
prevent them are often weak. As a science born out of the Enlightenment,
some economists view these apparently inconsistent social judgements as
‘distortions’. But in matters of life and death, there are limits to what such
8Although using an approach based on well-being, a broadly similar conclusion is reached in Clark et al.
(2020). However, Knieser and Sullivan (2020) report a much more finely balanced calculation for the United
States based on a weighted average value of around $46,000 per case.
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quantifiable approaches can deliver in terms of insight into the ethical issues
at stake and the practical decisions that must be taken. Whilst it is likely
to be true that we would not spend an infinite amount to save a life, it is
also true that we see and assess different kinds of risk very differently and
agree that a life is far more than a single number of pounds or dollars. This
is a position accepted by many influential philosopher–economists such as
Amartya Sen.9 We should note that in the case of COVID-19, older people
have much higher mortality rates. Thus, an application of the approach
would quickly run into the difficult issue of valuing the lives of older people
relative to those of younger people. While some judgements are unavoidable,
it would seem unpalatable to many to reduce these judgements to simple
monetary values.
It is better therefore, in our view, to think about broader and deeper
approaches to assess policy in relation to social goals that society wishes
to achieve, and controlling infections for COVID-19 is now chief among
these. This is very much like the way that we generally operate in spheres
such as fighting climate change or reducing child poverty, where we think
about how to achieve a series of targeted policy goals. These are to be
assessed against corresponding metrics with appropriate measurement tools
to monitor their achievement. An important feature of COVID-19 is the
immediacy of the policy response needed and the assessment of how existing
policies that protect the economy, some acting as automatic stabilisers, work
alongside targeted policies. Nonetheless, the economic approach is powerful
in identifying and analysing these metrics and provides another way in which
economists can add value to this debate. It can also use microdata to help in
predicting the impacts of policy, especially where incentives and behaviour are
involved. The targets are set after public discussion of the possible outcomes
that could occur, the actions available to influence them, and their likelihoods.
Economists can also help to identify ways of reducing health risks as the
lockdown is eased, thereby changing the trade-off between economic benefits
and health costs.
Another caveat to taking Figure 1 at face value is that it characterises the
trade-off in aggregate terms. But it matters whose incomes are protected and
whose lives are saved. One lesson from the COVID-19 crisis that is emerging
in a variety of empirical studies is the uneven impact on different groups.10 The
impact varies not only by income but also on other important dimensions such
as gender, ethnicity, region and age. The social goals and the comparison of
different means of achieving them have to include distributional issues around
who bears what costs and who receives which benefits in different dimensions
as central features.
9See, for example, Sen (2009).
10See, for example, Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a), Benzeval et al. (2020) and Blundell et al. (2020).
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There are well-established methods in economics for studying
distributional judgements.11 A key idea is that one should be willing to
trade-off aggregate gains in order to have gains that are more equally
distributed; this is a feature of most standard welfare functions. Moreover,
even using the sum of utilities as a criterion implies considerations of
distribution if individuals have diminishing marginal utility, because a
marginal pound to a poorer person would be deemed by many to be more
valuable to a marginal pound to a richer person. One way to operationalise
this in practice is to propose a set of distributional weights that reflect this,
for example, by attaching a higher weight to a given benefit when it is
for a poorer person. Moreover, such methods are often applied in public
investment appraisals. As we emphasise further below, taking distribution into
account is essential when looking at policy – the same mix of protection of
lives and incomes could involve very different effects on different members
of society.
3. Political economy
Economic frameworks are useful for framing the issues but politics is always
in the background.12 One way to think about the role of politics is as a way
of aggregating diverse views and interests. We have already emphasised that
different approaches and policies have distributional consequences, which
need to be weighed up. These cannot be purely matters of expert judgements,
and politics has always served as a way of trying to reconcile competing
policy views or positions that affect citizens differently. The aggregation
problem extends to the advice from experts, whether they be economists or
medical experts. To the extent that such advice is conflicting or embodies
distributional judgements, then politicians as elected representatives are
ultimately responsible and face accountability through the ballot box in a
way that scientists or other experts are not. There is no reason to expect that
politics will reach consistent positions as competing views vie with each other
to gain an upper hand. And, if citizens themselves do not have consistent or
well-formed views on policy, it is not surprising that this becomes reflected
in policymaking.
Although many are unhappy about the way specific decisions are made,
it is misconceived to view politics solely as a nuisance in the process of
policymaking. Many experts disagree and someone or some process has to
make the adjudication among competing views. The process of government
politics also creates the framework for legitimacy for policy actions and
11Classic contributions are Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973).
12See Besley (2020) for a broad discussion of such issues as they have played out during the COVID-
19 pandemic.
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building trust. Politicians have to explain their actions to each other and to
the public, thereby creating a framework of transparency and accountability.
When it comes to the economics of lockdown, policy advice has been
key in trying to inform the political process. Expert advice is based on
the best available evidence, but in a world of choices and trade-offs and
distributional judgements, science alone will not be able to give an answer.
Politics provides the framework that makes policy responses possible. But
having coherent objectives and institutional frameworks to structure that
engagement is essential. The COVID-19 pandemic has thrown up a range
of debates about how the process of policymaking has worked and what
frameworks have been used that will ultimately require some scrutiny.
IV. A policy framework
A strategic policy approach should have, at its core, the design of the best
combination of policies to achieve the desired level of infection control at
a minimum economic cost with due respect for distributional consequences.
Calculations and calibrations of those costs then provide guidance for the
different containment strategies that could be considered. It is important to
consider the right portfolio of economic tools. A major lesson from policy
analysis is that the identification of which combinations of instruments are
needed to meet which goal is essential to social decision-making. Crucially,
this means paying attention to the distributional consequences of each measure
as well as to the economic incentives that they create.
For policy analysis, we first need clarity on goals and metrics associated
with measuring success in achieving those goals. An approach sometimes
referred to as cost-effective analysis examines how to manage and assess
the costs of achieving goals in different ways. In the current context, the
goal of maintaining control over infections should then be weighed against
economic costs and their distributions associated with achieving that goal
through different means.
Therefore, there are two broad sets of considerations. First, there is a direct
benefit to relaxing lockdown measures in the form of gains to consumers and
workers. This can be picked up with changes in costs of production, wages,
consumption and employment, depending on the context. It is important to ask
who the beneficiaries are, as they are unlikely to be uniform, and distribution
matters.13 Second, there is cost in terms of the consequences for infection
rates associated with such measures. Mostly these cannot be measured directly,
but measuring the effects of interactions between individuals on public
13During the COVID-19 crisis, there have been large advances in bringing in real-time data from financial
transactions for doing this. See, for example, Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a), Carvalho et al. (2020) and
Hacioglu et al. (2020a, b).
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transportation or of increased density in social interactions is critical, at least
as an intermediate step in studying this. This will give a feel for how far the
easing of lockdown measures changes the infection rate.14
An important way of monitoring the progression of a disease such as
COVID-19 is to look at the replication rate, often referred to as R.15 Focusing
on changes in R in response to policy, both nationally and locally, is one
way to bring public health and economics together.16 Relaxation of lockdown
policies can increase R with economic, health and social consequences, which
need to be evaluated against potential economic benefits from this relaxation.
But the use of this approach requires appropriate allowance for uncertainty.
For example, going from a value of 0.5 to 0.6 is less worrying than moving
from 0.8 to 0.9, given uncertainty about R and the risks, and major economic,
social and political costs associated with a second wave. There is a useful
analogy between this approach and the use of temperature targets in climate
change (such as keeping well below 2 ◦C), which can be helpful in a rational
assessment of acceptable risk. Policy should be responsive in real time,
depending on how far stated goals are being met. This is why measurement
is so important to support the approach.
The assessment of the measurement of ‘best’ or ‘least cost’ could
be important. Optimisation of the mathematical expectation of some
objective function need not be the simple dominant criterion. The nature of
uncertainties, the magnitude of consequences, and possible disagreement over
values are such that we may choose actions that are robust in the sense that
they perform reasonably well relative to other policies over a range of possible
scenarios. Given uncertainties and gaps in knowledge, we should build in
opportunities and processes for learning.
The lowest economic cost should not be confused with lowest cost to
the public purse. Costs imposed by regulations can reduce employment or
lead to inefficient utilisation of assets. Many of these costs are passed on to
consumers in the form of higher prices. Other measures that require increased
expenditures or lower tax revenues fall on government budgets in the first
instance but do ultimately become costs or benefits to taxpayers, depending
on their effects.
14Innovative work, such as that by Couture et al. (2020), is making use of mobile phone data to look
at social distancing in the United States. There are also projects that are looking at infection rates in an
increasingly granular way; see, for example, the use of local measures of R (https://rs-delve.github.io/Rmap/
map).
15This is defined as the number of cases that are expected to occur on average in the population following
the infection of a single individual. So if one person develops the infection and passes it on to two others,
then R is equal to 2. If the average R in the population is greater than 1, then the infection will spread
exponentially whereas if R is less than 1, then the infection will spread slowly, eventually dying out.
16See the discussion by Budish (2020), who considers how to formulate a social welfare maximising
approach subject to the constraint that R is less than 1.
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FIGURE 2
Better policy design
Effective engagement between citizens and government should also be
viewed as a policy tool, given the importance of trying to influence the
behaviour of citizens through moral persuasion and information. Building trust
and confidence in measures taken by government is a way of improving the
effectiveness of policy and can be thought of as part of achieving economic
and public health gains. Thus, we should be sufficiently predictable in the
criteria for, and design of, policies to carry the confidence of people who
will be taking their own decisions. So, it is important to go beyond only
considering the standard things studied in public economics, such as taxes,
transfers and regulations. This requires a partnership between economics and
other social sciences.
What we are suggesting can be related to the approach discussed in the
previous section by thinking about good policy as a way of relaxing the trade-
off between saving lives and the protection of incomes. We are looking ideally
for policy innovations, which shift out the frontier, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Here, better combinations of income and health protection are possible, no
matter how we choose to value them. However, we would stress that, although
this is a useful test for whether policies have value, it is hard to capture
many aspects solely in terms of this way of thinking, not least that careful
consideration would have to be given to the distributional impact of policies.
Also, it is not a necessary condition of good policy that it shifts the frontier out,
as it could find a way of protecting a specific vulnerable group more effectively
even if this leads to more overall lives being lost and less aggregate protection
of incomes. That is not to argue that we are looking for such policies, but
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where distribution is a key issue, who gains and loses may matter more than
aggregate outcomes.
V. Applications
We now sketch a number of examples to illustrate how an approach along the
lines of our suggestion can be useful in framing policy discussions in specific
areas. Each of these applications is worthy of a study in its own right.
1. Workplace public health measures
Social distancing rules at work are likely to remain in place for some time
to come. Such rules may make businesses unviable, or lead them to put
up prices or to operate at a reduced scale that could lead to job losses.
Even so, such measures could make eminent sense when it is clear how the
specific regulation contributes to achieving the defined objective of controlling
infection. But such measures have to be considered as a package alongside test,
trace and isolate (TTI) and support programmes for firms and workers. When
determining the stringency of regulations, the design should be focused on the
responsiveness of the infection to policy intervention rather than narrowly on
where the infection rate is highest.
Some measures can reduce infection at a relatively low cost, such as asking
employees to wear face masks. Other measures being proposed are workplace
rotation schemes.17 In making comparisons across policy interventions, it
is the incremental or marginal costs and marginal benefits that need to be
examined. It is important to consider incentives. Firms can gain financially
by implementing measures that allow their business to operate more fully.
Where possible, policies should encourage the use of the creativity and local
knowledge that firms have about the environment in which they operate.
Government has limited knowledge of how specific businesses run.
2. Support for workers
Many workers who test positive or are forced to self-isolate will not be able
to work. A scheme is therefore needed to support firms in encouraging them
to test their workers and to help workers comply with isolation requirements.
Some sectors, such as professional sports and (some) universities, are already
developing their own testing strategies. This has the potential to bring local
knowledge to bear on the design and implementation of measures. A key
question is how far the state needs to mandate measures and, if so, of
what form.
17See Ely, Galeotti and Steiner (2020).
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Designing policy in this area requires insights from social psychology and
behavioural economics as well as more standard insights about individual
incentives. Appealing to civic duty is fine but this can be limited without
strong supporting mechanisms in place to enable discharge of the duty, and
some understanding that the measures make sense. In all cases, distributional
consequences of policies need to be considered. The associated perceptions of
fairness may influence both voluntary compliance and political acceptability.
Differentiation may bring challenges in acceptance and administration but
these are not hard and fast reasons to dismiss it completely; that could
be costly.
3. Determining sectoral priorities
As we have already seen in the post-lockdown period, exit policies need to
be targeted across a range of key dimensions, including time, geography,
age/fitness and type of activity. There is now an emerging body of economic
evidence and analysis that can inform policy in this area, including analyses of
the potential for working from home.18 Where possible, we advocate a bottom-
up approach, recognising the differences across sectors and space. This is
important because regulations will hit different sectors heterogeneously.
The wage subsidy scheme, which has been announced to replace the
furlough scheme, recognises the importance of judgements being made
in firms. Ways of reorganising business practices and their consequences
will differ greatly. Businesses are also located in production networks and
have multiplier effects through supply chains that need to be analysed and
considered.19 Many of these will be spatially specific. For example, the use
of public transportation by customers and workers is also a key component of
any sectoral analysis and policies should recognise local conditions. The costs
of locking down the same sector in two different locations need not have the
same public health implications.
4. Public transportation
This sector presents a range of specific challenges where economics and
public health must work together. Traditionally, this sector has been subsidised
by the state in part to reduce pollution and congestion. Thus, we do not
necessarily expect it to run a profit and there are significant public subsidies
already. But the need for social distancing makes many parts of the sector
even more unprofitable. Raising fares to plug the financial gap will hit poor
people particularly hard and is not an attractive solution. Subsidy programmes
18See, for example, Adams-Prassl et al. (2020b) and Joyce and Xu (2020).
19See Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi (2019) for an overview.
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and bailouts to providers should be used strategically to ensure that there are
strong incentives for providers to help implement public health measures for
customers and staff, based on a thorough economic analysis of alternatives.
A key policy challenge is how to cope with having a sector whose assets
will be working well below capacity for a period of time. There is mounting
evidence of the severe financial blow that public transportation in developing
cities has already suffered.20 As we move further into the recovery period,
it will be important to think ahead on subsidies and bailouts to consider
medium-term goals, such as environmental sustainability and levelling-up. In
addition, the infrastructure and practices would need to adapt for remaking
public transportation a safe option for mass commuting.21
5. Educational institutions
Schools have now reopened and universities are also moving into a new
academic year. There is significant variation in their approaches and
preparedness. To the extent that there is learning from experience and good
practice, this is not problematic in itself as there is a need for specific
strategy that reflects local circumstances. In universities, embedding TTI
among students and staff to enhance the attractiveness of a return to a viable
campus model yields gains in the educational experience and makes the UK
more competitive in the global market for students. So, viable public health
measures in student residences and lecture halls need to be weighed against
the impact of economic costs (short and long term) to the sector in deciding
whether and how any subsidies to universities are warranted. So far, student
numbers have held up well and the priority has been to ensure that the learning
experience is maintained.
Schools raise other issues because, as well as imparting knowledge, they
are an important provider of child-care services to enable parents to work
more productively. The crisis has emphasised the important gender aspect,
as women have tended to take on caring responsibilities disproportionately.22
An important policy challenge is to find the right infection threshold for
school closures that balances public health and economic considerations
in line with the framework that we are suggesting here. Moreover, it is
important to consider heterogeneity here when formulating policy; the long-
run costs of two years of disrupted schooling is likely to have far greater
impacts on the very young (children of primary school age) compared with
those in tertiary education, and this may also have a more severe impact on
disadvantaged populations.
20See Bird, Kriticos and Tsivanidis (2020).
21See Ardila-Gomez (2020).
22See, for example, Andrew et al. (2020).
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6. Priorities for vaccines
Economic analysis will also be important in making decisions about the
priorities in rolling out a vaccine when one becomes available. Some
consideration should be given to where vaccinating workers yields the highest
economic gains so that other costly public health interventions can be relaxed.
But distributional issues, including around vulnerability, are important too in
deciding where to target within the population towards those at greatest risk.
Economic incentives can also be used to encourage vaccination, for example
through enlisting employers in implementing a vaccination programme for
their workers.
7. Locally targeted approaches
Infection is mostly a local externality, so that strategies have to incorporate a
spatial component that is responsive to the infection rates and characteristics
of an area; they require the ability to increase or reduce the severity of
measures in ways that we have seen in recent months. The degree to which
local authorities can exploit local information to make this viable should be
explored. Localised lockdowns administered from the centre may limit the
extent to which they are perceived as legitimate and hence risk reducing
compliance. Also, the government can learn from the private sector as it uses
its local knowledge to find better ways of operating.
VI. From rescue to recovery
The time frame for policy measures is critical. Government has to be clear
about recovery measures that it plans to put in place, which will soon restart
many parts of the economy. This also affects health risk mitigation strategies,
compliance and political acceptability, and bears on firms’ plans, particularly
when they assess whether to declare bankruptcy. Where measures can be kick-
started even in partial lockdown, there is a case to get them underway, to avoid
large costs from cliff edges or uncertainties.
In the medium term, increased labour costs associated with precautions,
such as social distancing, will likely lead to more substitution of capital for
labour. If the government does not want this, then a structured programme
of ongoing wage subsidies (of the kind to which the furlough programme is
now transitioning) will be needed. But these also need to be better coordinated
with public health measures, such as linking subsidies to participation in a TTI
programme. So far, this remains a work in progress.
The longer the lockdown measures continue, the more there may
be permanent shifts from in-person to online transactions, with social
implications as we have already seen in the decline of the high street. Decisions
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will need to be made about whether to deploy tax and subsidy instruments
to lean against this trend or to promote them if they improve longer-term
economic outcomes. Active labour market and training policies can equip
people for a changed economy, government and social priorities around
structural adjustment, for a different working life, and with skills for the future,
including those associated with sustainability and levelling-up.
We know from past recessions that the young suffer most (because of
vulnerability to unemployment and scarring). Building policies to anticipate
this, including investment in human capital, especially in sectors that employ
many young people, will be helpful. The consequences of lost schooling will
have an economic cost in the future that many have been trying to quantify. As
we do our best to protect the old or infirm from COVID-19, we must also do
our best to protect the young from the long-term costs on their education and
future working lives – on which there is a rich economic literature.
Down the line, there will need to be measures that acknowledge that
many businesses will have become unviable due to the lockdown. Emergency
lending programmes will likely create unserviceable levels of debt, which will
probably have to be converted into equity stakes – if not written off completely.
This requires a discussion of criteria and mechanisms to distinguish those
businesses that will be supported from those that will not. Also, what types of
conditionalities or partnerships are needed as loans are unwound or converted
to equity. This may have to happen before the pandemic is over, so that it could
be tied to an incentive to undertaking appropriate public health measures. This
process of subsidy and refinancing should focus on the jobs and activities of
the future; looking backwards risks creating insecurity and missing out on
opportunities to steer towards a more sustainable and equitable economy and
society. We have examined these issues in other work on the recovery.
A reasonable assumption is that measures will be needed for at least the
next two years, possibly longer. No doubt testing and treatment will continue to
improve, but public health measures and their economic consequences would
still be there at a later stage. The creation and distribution of a vaccine could
change the nature of the choices that are faced. However, it is important
to avoid putting too much weight on this; the prospects for an effective
vaccine remain highly uncertain and that the extent to which infection leads to
immunity will take some time to be established. Hence, effective interventions
that can protect both health and the economy may even need to persist into the
long term. To keep the economy moving over that period may therefore require
an economic stimulus package on an ongoing basis for some time to come.
This needs to focus on preserving investment in skills. It also needs to keep
some important agendas that preceded the crisis: levelling-up parts of the UK
that have fallen behind, meeting the net zero 2050 goal on carbon emissions
and ensuring that the UK remains a globally competitive and innovative
economy. Some of our most successful sectors, such as the cultural sector,
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crucial to the attractiveness of the UK, will be particularly hit hard. Tough
decisions will need to be made about support that is needed if the UK wishes
to remain a global leader and a desirable destination.
It is therefore essential to develop a paradigm and framework for putting
together considerations of economics and public health, and this will have
lasting benefits, thereby emphasising that health and economic success
complement each other rather than trade off against one another. New
structures that allow firms to support their workers’ health and encourage them
towards life-long learning may even end up being beneficial in the medium and
long term once the crisis is over.
VII. Concluding comments
The health shock associated with the COVID-19 crisis quickly became an
economic shock and locking down the economy was an important part of
this. Many of these measures, taken when the rates of death and infection
were increasing, were quite crude in their impact. In the next phase of
the policy response, measures have become more targeted both in terms
of generating lower economic cost and in targeting places where there are
regional outbreaks. It is increasingly realised that there will be no simple exit
even if a vaccine is discovered. So, the task is to manage the consequences of
COVID-19 in terms of both medical and economic interventions.
From an economic point of view, the question regarding what drives
behaviour is key. Policy works when citizens understand and respond to it.
Even in the case of explicit monetary incentives, it is highly uncertain how
firms and consumers will respond. And when it comes to responses grounded
in perceptions of risk, trust in authorities and behavioural norms, prediction
is even harder. There is relatively little reliable evidence that can be translated
from other contexts. Therefore, it is important to collect data to learn about
behavioural change and to understand its sources.
Throughout, we have stressed the need to bring disciplines together and
there have been important examples of collaborations that have emerged
through the pandemic. This includes partnerships between different branches
of the social sciences, but also between medical, data and social sciences. Even
when there are technological innovations, there is a need to understand how
these will affect society. A good example is the new testing and tracing app,
which relies on how it is used by people in order to be effective.
In years to come, there will be important debates about how structures in
place have facilitated a balance of expertise that is needed to bring economics
together with insights from public health, medical science, data science and
epidemiology. The health of a nation has both direct implications for well-
being, but also indirect benefits by facilitating a stronger economy. Policies
that are designed to promote health and well-being alongside increased
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productivity will be facilitated by having sound policymaking frameworks
in place. We also need to recognise that there is a real possibility of other
pandemics in the future; we must be much better prepared for the next one.
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